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CONTENTS
• In continental Europe, the unemployment rate has risen continuously from a low level of below 3 percent in the early
1970s to more than 10 percent in the late 1990s. If those who are in governmental employment schemes and in
early retirement are included, the unemployment rate runs as high as 20 percent in quite a few European countries,
including France and Spain.
• The basic rule for a stable employment situation in an economy is: nominal wages should stay in line with labor pro-
ductivity growth plus the increase in producer prices. In a situation of high unemployment, however, when the un-
employed are to be integrated into the labor market, the productivity rule has to be modified: the increase in real
wages should stay below the productivity growth rate until a satisfactory level of employment has been obtained.
• The most elegant approach to creating more employment is to improve labor productivity. If an economy succeeds in
raising labor productivity, there is more scope for real wage increases or for more employment. We should, however,
not overestimate the potential of an economy to increase labor productivity. If we want to integrate the unemployed,
average labor productivity in the economy is likely to decrease. We should be realistic enough as to expect trends in
Europe to be similar to those in the United States, where labor productivity per hour has increased by less than
1 percent per year since 1980.
• The task for Europe is to change the institutional setup of labor relations, to move wage formation closer to the mar-
ket process, and to allow greater wage differentiation. It is unlikely that the "social partners", i.e., the trade unions
and employers' associations, will be able to change the rule system sufficiently. Therefore, it is necessary to change
the legal rules, especially those in favor of the unemployed, for instance, by introducing a legal right for each individ-
ual to enter the labor market at a wage of his or her choice.
• If continental Europe wants to reduce unemployment, it will have to change the impact of the welfare state. With re-
spect to the level of benefits provided by unemployment and health insurance, a distinction should be made between
large risks and small risks for the individual. Such a distinction between large and small risks would allow the costs
of the social security system to be reduced, thus lowering the tax on labor. Insurance against large risks would be
mandatory, small risk coverage would be optional. With respect to financing the welfare state, more choice should be
given to the individual as concerns the insurance coverage that he/she desires.
• One serious issue concerning social welfare payments is determining the extent to which the level of social welfare
benefits should be scaled down for those who are able to work in order to increase the incentive to work and the in-
tensity of the search for work. A related issue is whether unemployment benefits should be reduced in their level or
in the length of time they are paid in order to intensify the job search and reduce the reservation wage.
• Shifting the employment issue to the EL) level would take attention away from the need to decentralize wage forma-
tion, i.e., to negotiate wages at the level of firms. It would be an incentive not to undertake the necessary steps to
solve national unemployment problems and it would shift the financial burden to those countries that are successful
in reducing unemployment. It would elevate the national labor market cartels to the EU level and it would blur the
lines of responsibility. National governments would shift their responsibility to the EU level. This would be an ex-
tremely dangerous development for European integration because the European cause would become the scape-
goat of failed national policies.
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Paper presented in the Astra-Ericsson Lecture, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm, April 22, 1999.1. Increasing Unemployment in
Continental Europe
1. Unemployment is the number one policy prob-
lem in continental Europe. The unemployment
rate in the European Union has risen continu-
ously from a low level of below 3 percent in the
early 1970s to more than 10 percent in the late
1990s, and this stepwise increase in the unem-
ployment rate is dominated by the development
in the countries on the continent (Figure 1). In
most European countries, there was a ratchet ef-
fect after each of the last three recessions, with
unemployment moving upward in each reces-
sion and not fading away in the years of higher
growth; for example, in West Germany unem-
ployment increased by roughly one million each
time. If those who are in governmental employ-
ment schemes and in early retirement are in-
cluded, the unemployment rate runs as high as
20 percent in quite a few European countries,
including France and Spain (Siebert 1999c).
Quite in contrast to this development, the unem-
ployment rate has not increased systematically
in the United States over the last 30 years; now
it is even at a lower level than in 1970.
Job creation has been weak in Europe, espe-
cially in the major continental countries Ger-
many, France and Italy. In the 1980s, employ-
Figure 1: Unemployment Rates and Employment in the European Union and the United States
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Source: OECD (1998).ment increased at a rate of 0.3, 0.2 and 0.0 per-
cent per year in Germany, France and Italy, re-
spectively (Table 1 in the Appendix). In the
1990s, the average rates per year were -0.9, 0.1
and -0.5 percent. The United States did much
better with rates of 1.9 and 1.1 percent per year.
The United States added 53 million jobs to its
79 million work force of 1970 by 1998; Europe
augmented its 131.5 million labor force by only
18 million. Investment (private nonresidential
fixed capital formation) was also weak in the
major European countries in the 1990s, stagnat-
ing in France and Italy and rising only slowly in
Germany in spite of the unification stimulus. In
contrast, the United States had a high rate of 5.6
percent. It is quite clear that the poor perform-
ance in Europe cannot be permitted to continue.
What can be done?
2. The Fundamental Rule
2. Employment and unemployment are deter-
mined by a complex set of factors which inter-
act in the economic system. It is therefore diffi-
cult to develop a simple strategy with which to
reduce unemployment. You cannot turn only
one screw in order to solve the problem. In
contrast, we have to turn many screws, and the
economic machine has to be partially rebuilt to
allow an equilibrium in the labor market with a
satisfactory level of employment. What are the
essential elements of an approach that would
reduce unemployment?
The basic rule for a stable employment situa-
tion in an economy is: real wages should not in-
crease more than the rate of labor productivity
growth. This means: nominal wages should stay
in line with labor productivity growth plus the
increase in producer prices.
1 Then employment
will remain constant. Note that the rule refers to
producer prices, which are relevant for the de-
cision of the firms to hire workers, and not to
consumer prices, which are relevant for the real
income of workers.
3. In a situation of high unemployment, how-
ever, when the unemployed are to be integrated
into the labor market, the productivity rule has
to be modified. Keeping real wage increases in
line with productivity growth will only stabilize
employment and perpetuate unemployment. It
will not create new jobs. To integrate a large
number of the unemployed into the labor mar-
ket, the wage increase should stay below the
productivity growth rate until a satisfactory
level of employment has been obtained. Stated
another way: an increase in labor productivity
brought about by laying off people cannot be
the measuring rod for determining wage in-
creases in wage bargaining. Care must be taken
to use employment-neutral productivity growth
as a baseline in wage negotiations.
4. In any case, the productivity rule has be-
come more difficult to obey with the rate of
productivity growth declining in major conti-
nental European countries during the last 40
years from 5 percent in the 1960s and 4 percent
in the 1970s to 2 percent in the 1980s and
1990s. For instance, in Germany the rate de-
clined from 5.5 percent in the 1960s and 4.1
percent in the 1970s to 2.6 percent since 1980
(Siebert 1998a).
2 If the figure for the statisti-
cally measured productivity increase relating to
the last 20 years were corrected for the rising




5. Demand siders see a potential approach to
creating more employment in stimulating ag-
gregate demand. In the context of the basic rule,
the idea is to have more scope for firms to pass
on cost increases and to utilize capacity better;
statistically, this implies higher measured labor
productivity. There are two major arguments
against this approach.
Note that, in an open economy, producer prices may
not increase as much as consumer prices because of
the intensity of international competition. Therefore,
the scope of firms in the export sector to pass on
wage increases is limited.
For Italy the figures are 6.8 (1960s), 4.0 (1970s), 2.6
(1980s), and 1.9 (1990s), for Sweden 4.9, 2.4, 1.2 and
1.9, for France 3.7 (1970s), 2.9 and 1.5, for the Nether-
lands 4.4, 2.4 and 1.5 (OECD 1998: Table 5.8).First, there are opportunity costs of financing
an expansion of aggregate demand (Siebert
1999b). Of course, the opportunity costs are nil
if the export demand of a country increases be-
cause it is financed abroad. For the other com-
ponents of aggregate demand, however, the
story is a different one.
With respect to monetary policy, not too
many, except occasionally Paul Krugman, real-
ly seriously suggest that we should accept a
higher inflation rate in order to enjoy short-run
gains in employment. Unfortunately, the long-
run opportunity costs of such an approach con-
sist in the loss of a stable money. If market par-
ticipants anticipate the higher inflation rate per-
fectly, there will be no impact on the real econ-
omy, i.e., the Phillips curve will be vertical.
3
A more delicate matter is whether the central
banks use all the scope they have to expand the
money supply. We should remind ourselves,
however, that the increase in the money supply
shows up in the price level with a time lag, for
instance, in West Germany after 10 quarters, so
that a low current inflation rate is not a suffi-
cient signal to expand the money supply. More-
over, the money supply should be expanded
such that the growth of the production potential
is financed. Going beyond this (and making
some allowance for a tolerable rise in the price
level and for a change in the velocity of money)
raises the risk that monetary policy could be-
come unsteady and restless. This implies uncer-
tainty for market participants and volatility of
monetary variables, including the interest rate
and the exchange rate. This, in turn, feeds into
the real sphere of the economy. The opportunity
costs of this approach are high and may be de-
trimental in the long run. Even if the consumer
price index remains relatively stable, this is not
a sufficient indicator that monetary policy does
not cause disruptions. Money expansion may
start an asset price inflation, with a new pattern
of the business cycle in which the boom is stop-
ped when the bubble bursts. The correction of
the bubble causes severe economic hardship, as
the Japanese experience shows (Siebert 1999d).
In an open economy, an increase in the money supply
cannot expand the scope of firms to shift price hikes
because they then will lose competitiveness.
Increasing government spending, as sug-
gested by some, is likely to turn out not to be a
stabilizer for the economy. The main reason for
this is that the political process has not been ca-
pable of bringing the budget into balance over
the business cycle. On the contrary, expendi-
tures have risen over time, including welfare
state entitlements, with a negative impact on the
demand for labor. Moreover, in most European
countries, the interest burden in public budgets
is extremely high, so that policy has lost its ma-
neuvering space.
Second, even if there were no opportunity
costs of stimulating aggregate demand, addi-
tional demand would not necessarily carry over
to employment. One reason for this is that an
increase in domestic income is partly being used
for imports and savings and does not fully trans-
late into effective domestic consumer demand.
The other reason is that there is no one-to-one
relationship between an increase in GDP and an
increase in employment. Taking the case of
Germany, a growth rate threshold of 2 percent
has to be surpassed before employment starts to
pick up. A growth rate of one percent over the
threshold value, i.e., a growth rate of 3 percent,
adds 0.5 percent to employment, by far not
enough to solve the unemployment problem.
4. Improving Labor Productivity
6. The most elegant approach to creating more
employment is to improve labor productivity. If
an economy succeeds in raising labor produc-
tivity, there is more scope for real wage in-
creases or for more employment. So how can
we raise labor productivity?
Cutting Costs
A cost-cutting strategy is the immediate re-
sponse of firms when profits are squeezed, and
the manufacturing sector has used this line in
the United States (in the 1980s) and in Europe
(in the 1990s). Cutting costs by shedding labor
raises labor productivity, but it is not a promis-
ing policy approach to solve the unemployment
problem in an economy. It causes firms to es-
tablish their competitiveness by making explicit
that jobs are not sustainable.Innovation
A more promising approach is the innovation of
new products, of superior production processes
and of a more efficient organization. But how
can an economy obtain a higher rate of innova-
tion? Quite clearly, the government itself can-
not produce new technological knowledge. Pub-
lic administrators and political cabinets do not
have the relevant information to know which
product will do well on the market. Thus, any
explicit technology policy, strategic industrial
policy, or strategic trade policy will be dashed
against the rocks of the Hayekian argument of
the presumption of information (Hayek 1968).
Moreover, the government would tend to so-
cialize the costs of a technology policy failure,
thus creating a systematic moral hazard for the
future. Rent seeking would be induced. The line
to stimulate innovation must therefore be to de-
fine a reliable framework for the private sector
in which innovations flourish. This should not
be done through preferential treatment of inno-
vation per se, as this is likely to cause distor-
tions. Instead, an investment-friendly tax sys-
tem is required. In addition, the role of the gov-
ernment is to develop an outstanding institutio-
nal environment for basic research (which is to
be financed by government) and for the transfer
of new knowledge to firms.
The Role of Investment in Equipment
Investment in physical capital is the most im-
portant vehicle, besides human capital forma-
tion, by which new technological knowledge is
implemented. A high rate of investment leads to
a high rate of economic growth, whereas the
nearly stagnating real capital formation in the
continental European countries in the 1990s
contributed to their poor employment perform-
ance. The example of the United States demon-
strates that, as a result of double-digit rates of
increase in investment in equipment since 1995,
the production potential has become surpris-
ingly elastic, high growth rates have been
achieved, and labor has been absorbed into the
production process. The recommendation for
economic policy in Europe, therefore, is to es-
tablish conditions such that firms want to in-
vest. Here, taxation is of crucial importance.
The major task of continental European coun-
tries, therefore, is to come up with tax reforms
that will stimulate investment. Equity-oriented
tax reforms will not be helpful.
Higher real economic growth and the more
dynamic investment climate it engenders tend
to have a positive impact on employment, but it
would be a strategic error to assume that eco-
nomic growth alone will do away with unem-
ployment, as already explained before. If one
does not want to be dependent on the growth
rate surpassing quite a high threshold value for
employment to pick up, the task must be to in-
crease the employment intensity of growth and
also to reduce the employment threshold of
growth. This can only be done by changing the
institutional setup of wage formation and labor
relations.
Locational Competition
Governments that want to improve labor pro-
ductivity find themselves under a new severe
restraint. They compete for mobile capital and
mobile technological knowledge. With capital
being mobile and firms being capable of opti-
mizing their location as well as tailoring their
structure, governments have to realize that
capital and technological knowledge may emi-
grate or may not come to a country if economic
policy is inappropriate. Less capital, however,
implies a lower labor productivity or a smaller
increase in labor productivity. This implies a
lower potential for wages and for employment.
A national government which does not un-
derstand and respect the mechanism of loca-
tional competition is likely to miss its employ-
ment target and its goal to improve the well-
being of its citizens.
Deregulation of Product and Capital Markets
Since the demand for labor is a derived demand
(being derived from the demand for products),
favorable conditions on the product markets are
always welcome. Improved international com-
petitiveness will yield a higher labor productiv-
ity; deregulating goods markets may strengthen
the demand for labor. A related argument points
to the necessity to deregulate the capital market
so that firms, especially new firms, can obtaineasy access to new capital. At the end of the
day, however, the labor market is the decisive
issue for employment. Improving the competi-
tiveness of firms in the product markets and
easing the access to capital does not guarantee a
strong demand for labor: firms can also become
more competitive by increasing their capital in-
tensity and by taking advantage of labor-saving
technical progress.
Human Capital Formation
Labor productivity can be influenced by human
capital formation. It is realistic to start from the
premise that labor productivity is likely to be
spread unevenly among the work force. The fre-
quency distribution may be concentrated near
the mean (Figure 2a), or it may even be skewed
towards low productivity. Unfortunately, we do
not have sufficient information on the density
function of the skill distribution in the indivi-
dual European economies. Comparative data are
available on literacy (OECD 1994,1997) and on
qualifications in specific areas as a result of
school teaching (such as in mathematics and in






natural sciences in the TIMSS study, see Max-
Planck-Institut fur Bildungsforschung et al.
1997). Another, more general category of infor-
mation is input going into productivity, such as
the years of schooling (Barro and Lee 1996),
and the impact of human capital formation on
the rates of return on education (Hall and Jones
1999; Gundlach et al. 1998).
Human capital formation can be viewed as im-
proving labor productivity generally and chang-
ing the density function, possibly leading to a
more equal distribution of labor productivity
among the members of the work force. Thus, it
is hypothesized by Nickell (1997) that Euro-
pean countries have a more equal distribution of
labor productivities among the work force than
the United States and that their work force looks
more like Figure 2b than 2a.
The University System and Basic Research
Empirical evidence suggests that the institutio-
nal setup ("social infrastructure", according to
Hall and Jones 1999), under which individuals
accumulate skills and firms accumulate capital
and produce output, is a major determinant of
productivity per capita. An important line of at-
tack to improve human capital is the organiza-
tion of the educational system and basic re-
search. Here, there is anecdotal evidence that
some countries in Europe, among them Ger-
many, no longer have an adequate university
system. Equity orientation that led to the expan-
sion of the welfare state has prevented organiz-
ing the university system according to the com-
petition principle, and social aspects and admin-
istrative and planning approaches have a domi-
nant impact on the university system. Basic re-
search is exposed to labor market regulations
and other bureaucratic rules that prevent flexi-
bility and initiative. This means that, if Euro-
pean countries want to stimulate innovation,
they have to say good-bye to their administra-
tive approach to the university system.
The Apprenticeship System and Training on the
Job
The apprenticeship system, or the dual system
of learning on the job together with formal
schooling for young people, which is in place in
some European countries, seems to be an assetfor human capital formation which allows young
people to be integrated into the labor market
and their productivity to be enhanced. How-
ever, this system should be modernized, for
instance, by introducing new types of occu-
pation more quickly and introducing other im-
provements.
Working Time Flexibility
Labor productivity can be increased by organiz-
ing labor more flexibly, especially by arranging
working time in a more flexible way. In many
European countries, working time has been
regulated too rigidly. Such regulation does not
allow potential productivity increases to be ex-
ploited. Working time should be flexible over
the year to allow firms to cope with seasonal
shifts in demand; working time should also vary
over the ups and downs in the demand for
firms' products and over the business cycle.
More flexibility is possible by having a larger
band between the individual's minimum and
maximum working time per day (and per week,
as well as per month), by separating the work-
ing time for individuals from the operational
time of firms, and by introducing more innova-
tive part-time work arrangements. It is my im-
pression that noticeable progress has been made
in firms in introducing more working time
flexibility and that labor productivity has been
enhanced considerably, for instance, in Ger-
many.
The Solution Potential of the Innovation
Approach
To sum up for the strategy of innovation, we
should not overestimate the potential of an
economy to increase labor productivity. If we
want to integrate the unemployed, average labor
productivity in the economy is likely to de-
crease. We should be realistic enough to expect
trends in Europe to be similar to those in the
United States, where labor productivity per
hour has increased by less than 1 percent per
year since 1980.
4
In the United States, the rate of increase of labor pro-
ductivity per hour was 0.8 in the 1980s and 0.9 in
1990-1996 (OECD 1998: Table 5.8).
5. Changing the Institutional
Setup of Labor Relations
7. Postulating a basic rule to keep wage in-
creases below the productivity growth rate as
long as unemployment is high does not guaran-
tee that this condition will be satisfied in reality.
The task for Europe then is to change the insti-
tutional setup of labor relations so that the rule
is met more or less automatically. This means
moving wage formation closer to the market
process.
The institutional system that societies have
developed for the labor area is an intricate sys-
tem of norms, incentives, and behavior that has
an impact on the demand for labor, the supply
of labor, and wage formation. This impact is
similarly complex to the rules for using an
ecological system. As in an ecological system,
interventions at one spot eventually show up
elsewhere; the impact of a measure taken today
becomes fully apparent only after many years,
sometimes only in a decade. It is therefore nec-
essary to analyze the long-term impact of such a
rule system on the demand for labor and on the
supply of labor. In Europe, it is quite apparent
that the institutional arrangements do not gen-
erate a full employment equilibrium. They pro-
duce equilibria for the economy which are
characterized by a high level of unemployment.
8. An important aspect of getting wage for-
mation closer to the market process is decen-
tralization. This implies that wage changes
should be a vehicle with which to bring about
decentralized full employment equilibria in the
various regions, contributing to a balance be-
tween the demand for labor of sectors and firms
and the supply of labor. This equilibrium must
also relate to the qualifications required by
firms and offered by workers. Institutionally, it
can only be obtained if wage formation on the
economy level and on the sector level is given
up. Wage negotiations should not be binding in
the following interpretation: either they only
define a lower floor for the rate of increase of
wages from which firms can deviate upward
(wage drift), or they define a general frame of
reference in which it is left to the decentralized
level to find the appropriate wages. This re-
quires finding an institutional mechanism bywhich wages are set in the firms. The basic
mechanism is the market mechanism. In a way,
the analogy with the provision of bread is a
good one. Bread is such a fundamental product
that we want to make sure that everyone has
enough of it to eat. But this target is not satis-
fied by rules and regulations, the market does it.
In a similar way, the market will supply enough
jobs.
9. To leave it to the "social partners", i.e., to
trade unions and employers' associations, to
find and implement the necessary institutional
changes of decentralization, implies following a
corporativistic approach in which the social
partners are granted the privilege to bring about
the needed change in the rule system. Actually,
they have the legal right to set the wages (in
some countries with a constitutional guarantee
of that privilege), but they are not made re-
sponsible for the quantities that eventually re-
sult in the labor market. In such an approach, as
practiced in the Rhine model, which relies on
consensus, one of the social partners can block
a change in the rules. We therefore need an in-
stitutional control, for instance, a stipulation
that links wage agreements to the level of un-
employment. Thus, a wage increase in a region
above the rate of productivity growth should be
suspended if regional unemployment surpasses
a specified threshold. Without any such con-
straints, the consensus approach in an alliance
for work is likely to lead nowhere. Possibly, the
Agreement of Wassenaar was successful be-
cause in the Dutch institutional setup the gov-
ernment has the threat potential to execute a
wage stop.
10. It is unlikely that the "social partners"
have the capability to change the rule system
sufficiently. In my evaluation, it is therefore
necessary to change the legal rules. Besides
protecting the power of the social partners or
the wage cartel, the institutional framework
benefits those who have a job, the incumbents
or the insiders. The rules do not sufficiently
take into account the interests of those who are
unemployed, the new entrants or the outsiders.
Insiders are protected, whereas outsiders cannot
enter the labor market freely. Free entry, there-
fore, is a necessary and very essential condition
in reforming European labor markets. Labor
market rules have to be changed in favor of
those who are unemployed.
My proposal is that a legal right be intro-
duced for each individual to enter at a wage of
his or her choice.
5 Giving individuals the right
to enter the labor market at their chosen wage
would be a powerful mechanism to bring about
a full employment equilibrium by finding the
equilibrium wage rate and the equilibrium wage
structure. The approach proposed here is to
change the rules of the wage cartel, to give
more importance to the fringe of the cartel, and
to punch some holes into the walls that protect
the cartel.
6
Along with this proposal, wages agreed by
wage negotiations should not be declared man-
datory by the government. Declaring wages
mandatory reduces wage flexibility and de-
stroys the role of wages as a mechanism for
bringing about a good employment situation.
It is feared that, with such an institutional
setup, wages would fall all the way to the bot-
tom of the wage scale because there would be
no trade union to defend at least a lower floor
of the wage level. This fear is unfounded be-
cause as soon as wages fell below labor pro-
ductivity, demand for labor would increase.
Firms would compete for workers as soon as
labor productivity rose above the wage level.
Thus, the lower floor of the wage level is de-
termined by labor productivity. As it is in the
self-interest of the baker to produce bread and
not a result of his benevolence, it is in the self-
interest of profit-maximizing firms to hire labor
as soon as wages are lower than labor produc-
tivity.
6. Differentiating Wages
11. Keeping wage increases below productivity
growth as long as unemployment is high is one
element of a strategy for more employment. An
additional element is the necessity to have more
5 I doubt that the social partners will be able to stipu-
late that wage agreements explicitly allow outsiders
to enter at entrant's rates. Therefore, a law is re-
quired.
6 On specific proposals of necessary legal change in
Germany, compare Siebert (1998a).10
wage differentiation. There are three reasons for
wage differentiation. First, labor productivity is
not uniform over the millions of firms and over
the millions of workers in an economy. Each
country has a productivity ladder with higher,
middle and lower levels of productivity. This
requires wages to be differentiated according to
sectors, regions, firms, and workers' qualifica-
tions. Second, relative demand moves to the
disadvantage of the less qualified. This is a com-
mon phenomenon in the industrialized coun-
tries, in North America as well as in Europe
(Siebert 1999a). For instance, in Germany the
number of persons with higher qualifications
increased by 6.2 million in the period 1976-
1995, whereas the number of less qualified fell
by 4.2 million (Siebert 1998a: Table 10). Thus,
the terms of trade clearly moved to the disad-
vantage of the less qualified (Schimmelpfennig
1999). Third, structural change makes human
capital partly obsolete (Paque 1999). Whereas
in the 1950s and the 1960s a worker who lost
his job in a branch of industry could move to
another (similar) branch of industry, the
industrial worker who is laid off today has to
find a job in another sector, such as services in-
cluding information technology, which requires
a completely different human capital.
12. A potential way to get around a greater
wage differentiation is homogenous human
capital. Improving qualifications may be viewed
as the corresponding approach with which to
achieve this, but qualifications cannot be ex-
pected to improve productivity to a fully homo-
genous level, as is pointed out above. More-
over, human capital formation takes time.
13. Whereas the United States is character-
ized by a highly differentiated wage structure
and more differentiation over time, continental
Europe, including France and Germany, is not
prepared to accept such a differentiation (Figure
3). Normative equity considerations imply that
wages for low-paid jobs are rising overpropor-
tionately. This reduces the demand for labor in
the lower productivity segment of the labor
market. Similarly, regional wage structures,
such as those found in Germany, do not reflect
differences in regional unemployment, thus dis-
torting the labor market and increasing unem-
ployment.
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aRatio of upper earnings limits of the ninth decile (D9) to the first decile (D1) of male employees when employees are
ranked in order of their earnings from lowest to highest.
Source: Siebert (1998a) according to data from OECD (1996: Table 3.1).11
14. Starting from the premise that wage dif-
ferentiation is not acceptable politically, quite a
few now take refuge in proposing wage sub-
sidies that are supposed to bridge the gap be-
tween a desired higher wage level and the given
lower productivity in the lower segment of the
labor market. Wage subsidies can come in many
forms, as a subsidy to a firm if it employs an
unemployed person (possibly only a long-term
unemployed person), as a general subsidy to
firms per worker in the low-productivity seg-
ment, as a payment to workers themselves if
they are in low-paid jobs, or as a voucher per
unemployed worker which turns into a subsidy
for the firm if the worker is employed. I have
serious objections to wage subsidies. First, a
high fiscal burden is incurred in the long run.
For instance, one form of the wage subsidy, let-
ting people who are in social welfare retain 50
percent of their wages earned on the market in
order to provide an incentive to get out of the
unemployment trap, would pertain to a large
part of the work force, for instance 10 million
workers in Germany, roughly one-third of the
labor force (Gern 1999). Second, the sums
needed have to be raised by taxes which have
detrimental effects elsewhere in the economy.
Tax revenues will have to come from labor in-
come either as direct payroll taxes or indirectly
as value added taxes. Third, trade unions may
take the subsidy for granted and behave strate-
gically by raising wages in order to obtain a
higher subsidy. Fourth, the subsidy is a political
variable that is likely to rise in the political pro-
cess. Thus, wage subsidies will lead more and
more away from the necessary decentralized
market-oriented approach. The solution, there-
fore, should be that European countries accept
the necessary wage differentiation.
15. This analysis suggests that countries
should discontinue minimum wage policies.
Minimum wages are one cause of unemploy-
ment, as soon as they are binding. This is espe-
cially true for specific groups of workers. Thus,
minimum wage legislation in France is one rea-
son for the high youth unemployment. In addi-
tion, minimum wages that are not an effective
restraint nationally may nevertheless be binding
regionally.
7. Reforming the Welfare State
16. The reason why Europe is not prepared to
accept stronger wage differentiation is its equity
orientation and the expansion of the welfare
state that followed from this orientation. Quite
clearly, the welfare state has a severe impact on
employment and unemployment in a complex
web of interdependencies (Figure 4). There are
four reasons. First, in most countries the social
security systems are financed by a tax on labor.
This reduces the demand for labor. Second,
payroll taxes create a tax wedge between the
gross wage (producer's wage) and the net wage
(consumer's wage). It is an artificial distortion
that is to the disadvantage of labor. High in-
come taxes aggravate the problem further by
lowering the net wage for workers. This makes
a moderate wage policy less acceptable for the
trade unions and is an incentive for workers to
move to the shadow economy. Third, the social
security system and the income level provided
by it define a reservation wage which influ-
ences wage bargaining behavior and sets a floor
for the wage structure, even if no explicit legal
minimum wage is established. As the welfare
system has developed, the wage floor has gra-
dually increased, reducing the demand for labor
at the lower levels of the productivity ladder.
Fourth, the reservation wage influences labor
supply behavior and people's willingness to
move out of the "social security trap."
17. If continental Europe wants to reduce un-
employment, it will have to change the impact
of the welfare state. Reforming the welfare state
has several aspects. One is the level of entitle-
ments that is provided by the social security
systems. The other is the mode of financing the
social security systems.
Differentiating between Large Risks and Small
Risks
18. With respect to the level of benefits provid-
ed by the social security systems, for instance,
unemployment and health insurance, a distinc-
tion should be made between what are large
risks and what are small risks for the individual.
Social security systems should protect the indi-12

































vidual against large risks, but the individual
should bear small risks himself. For instance,
the loss of income in the first three or five days
of unemployment can be considered to be a
small risk which can be covered by the individ-
ual's ability to pay, for instance, by his or her
own savings. Such a distinction between large
and small risks would allow the costs of the so-
cial security system to be reduced, thus lower-
ing the tax on labor. Insurance against large
risks would be mandatory; small risk coverage
would be optional.
This concept should also be applied to old
age pension systems in which the individual can
provide for extra coverage beyond the manda-
tory requirement by paying into a capital
funded system ("cappuccino" approach). Thus,
with respect to financing, more choice should
be given to the individual on the extent of in-
surance coverage that the individual desires.
Letting the individual decide on the extent of
social insurance coverage (in relation to the
premia to be paid) allows bringing about insur-
ance coverage at lower costs, implying a higher
labor income.
Scaling Down the Social Welfare Benefits for
Those Who Are Able to Work
19. Looking at the two different layers of in-
come floors provided by the social security
system (Siebert 1997), namely, welfare and un-
employment benefits, the serious issue for so-
cial welfare payments is the extent to which the
level of social welfare benefits should be scaled
down for those who are able to work in order to
increase the incentive to work and the intensity
of their search for work. A potential accompa-
nying approach is to offer a job to those who
are in social welfare programs, and to reduce
support if the job is declined. This approach
seems to be possible in countries where, in the
spirit of the principle of subsidiarity, social wel-
fare is organized on the municipal and county
level.13
Reducing the Duration of Unemployment
Benefits
20. A related question is whether the level of
the second layer of the income floor, unemploy-
ment benefits, should be reduced or whether the
duration of the benefits should be shortened in
order to intensify job search and reduce the re-
servation wage. Whereas the Untied States and
the United Kingdom have shortened the dura-
tion of the benefit to six months, insurance cov-
erage in continental countries lasts up to 33
months in France and 32 months in Germany
(with one type of unemployment benefits there
being given indefinitely). European countries
should discuss shortening the time that benefits
are paid for or scaling down the level of ben-
efits over the period of time the recipient is un-
employed.
The Principle of Equivalence in Social Security
Systems
21. Except for social welfare programs, the
principle of equivalence should be adhered to in
all the social security systems. This means that
there should be a relation between benefits re-
ceived and contributions paid by the individual.
This also implies that tax financing of social se-
curity systems should be avoided. This princi-
ple is of special relevance for old age insurance.
Admittedly, the implementation of this princi-
ple runs into the problem that the income floor
defined by the social welfare system, if pushed
high over time, prevents an equivalence-based
social security system because benefits can be
received without having made contributions.
7
Uncoupling the Financing of Social Security
from the Work Contract
22. With respect to the financing of social se-
curity entitlements, a far-reaching proposal is to
uncouple financing from the work contract. The
individual would purchase an insurance service
from his income, which also includes his capital
income. Such an approach would be attractive
for a number of reasons: it takes into account
Witness the inability to reduce the net rate of pen-
sions in Germany from 70 to 64 percent of the net
wage because pensions would then be in the neigh-
borhood of social welfare benefits.
that capital income (including income from sav-
ings) has become more important recently in
households' income. Moreover, the reality of
work relationships has changed considerably,
so that the traditional full-time worker, who has
a lifelong job, preferably in the same firm,
which was the frame of reference for the tradi-
tional social security systems, is no longer the
standard case.
8. Approaches on a European
Level?
23. Quite a few European governments, for in-
stance, the French government, see a possible
approach to more employment in becoming ac-
tive on the European level. The catchwords are
"European employment policy" or "European
employment pact", which are intended to stimu-
late a positive association for the voter. Look-
ing more closely, the terms are interpreted dif-
ferently and can mean different things.
One approach that has been discussed is stim-
ulating aggregate demand and coordinating de-
mand management. Some have in mind (mis-)
using the European Central Bank to finance an
excessive expansion of demand. I have already
discussed the opportunity costs of this approach.
With monetary policy being elevated to the
European level, coordination now relates to na-
tional fiscal policy and the optimal policy mix
between common monetary policy and national
fiscal policy. Admittedly, in macroeconomic
models with a nonvertical Phillips curve, theo-
retical arguments can be made for coordinated
demand management by a group of countries
like those in Western Europe. But it is quite
likely that coordination will fail. One reason for
this is that governments have different policy
concepts. Another is the impossibility of reach-
ing agreements between sovereign governments
because they have different interest positions.
Yet another is that time lags of the incidence of
fiscal policy instruments differ between coun-
tries. Experience with international arrange-
ments, such as the Plaza Agreement (1985) and
the Louvre Accord (1987), supports this posi-
tion. Besides, if explicit demand management14
has basically been a failure on the national
level, why try it on the European level?
A second approach is active employment
policy at the European level, such as EU em-
ployment programs. This is a highly question-
able and misleading approach because it could
open up a source of finance for those countries
that are unwilling or unable to do the required
reforms in their labor markets at home. This
would be an incentive not to undertake the nec-
essary steps to solve national unemployment
problems. Financing the EU programs would be
a burden for those countries that are successful
in their labor markets.
A third approach is that influential groups
intend to Europeanize wage formation. Such an
approach clearly goes the wrong direction when
decentralization of wage formation is required
and when it is necessary to take wage formation
closer to the market. It would elevate the na-
tional labor market cartels to the European
level. Anyone who thinks about approaches on
the European level must take into account that
labor productivities are quite divergent among
European countries ranging from 95 percent of
the west German level in France and 90 percent
in Austria to 60 percent in Spain and 35 percent
in Portugal (Siebert 1998b). A Europeanization
of wage policy would clearly worsen the un-
employment problem.
A disastrous development would be a mini-
mum wage for the European Union as proposed
by the French Finance Minister Strauss-Kahn.
8
Such a minimum wage would clearly aggravate
the level of unemployment.
Shifting the employment issue to the Euro-
pean level would take attention away from the
necessity to decentralize wage formation, i.e., to
negotiate wages at the level of firms. It would
blur the lines of responsibility. National gov-
ernments would shift their responsibility to the
European level. This would be an extremely
dangerous development for European integra-
tion because the European cause would become
the scapegoat of failed national policies.
The European employment approach can
only be an exchange of ideas on best practices
of different countries, a benchmarking with in-
ternational experience, and an attempt to reach
a consensus on the assignment problems where
the responsibility for employment rests with the
national governments.
9. Conclusion
24. At the beginning of a new century, conti-
nental European countries face a choice: either
they continue their labor market approach of the
last thirty years or they manage to revise their
approach to the unemployment problem. The
old approach will not reduce unemployment.
Taking a look at Japan in the late 1990s, it
seems that Japan has lost its capacity to solve
problems, and one can have the impression that
institutional constraints have become so power-
ful that the country is not strong enough to ini-
tiate the necessary changes. Sometimes, I begin
to have the impression that continental Europe
is in a similar state of losing its political capac-
ity to solve problems.
Politicians have to explain to the voter that
the economic conditions in the world and in
Europe are different now and that a new ap-
proach is needed. Politicians must go for a
change in their approach to the unemployment
problem. If they do not, they will fail.
Compare Suddeutsche Zeitung, April 17/18, 1999.Appendix
Table 1: Employment, Unemployment Rates
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Break in series as of January 1994.
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